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Abstract
Peer-To-Peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, dis-
tributed systems, with no centralized authority or infras-
tructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the avail-
ability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable
and unpredictable. In this paper, we use ideas from Game
Theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational
peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive
scheme to improve the system’s performance.
1 Introduction
Peer-To-Peer (P2P) systems are self-organizing, dis-
tributed resource-sharing networks. They differ from tra-
ditional distributed computing systems in that no central
authority controls or manages the various components;
instead, nodes form a dynamically changing and self-
organizing network. By pooling together the resources
of many autonomous machines, P2P systems are able
to provide an inexpensive platform for distributed com-
puting, storage, or data-sharing that is highly scalable,
available, fault tolerant and robust. As a result, a large
number of academic and commercial projects are un-
derway to develop P2P systems for various applications
[2, 3, 10, 9, 12, 1].
The democratic (or anarchic) nature of P2P systems,
which is responsible for their popularity and scalability,
also has serious potential drawbacks. There is no cen-
tral authority to mandate or coordinate the resources that
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each peer should contribute. Because of the voluntary
participation, the system’s resources can be highly vari-
able and unpredictable. Indeed, in a recent experimental
study of Napster and Gnutella, Saroiu et al. [11] found
that many users are simply consumers, and do not con-
tribute much to the system. In particular, they found that
(1) user sessions are relatively short; 50% of the sessions
are shorter than 1 hour, and (2) many users are free riders;
that is, they contribute little or nothing. For example, in
the Gnutella system, 25% of the users share no files at all.
Short sessions mean that a significant portion of the
data in the system might be unavailable for large periods
of time—the hosts with those data are offline. Short upti-
mes also hurt system performance because there are fewer
servers to download files from. Similarly, as a growing
number of users become free riders, the system starts to
lose its peer-to-peer spirit, and begins to resemble a more
traditional client-server system.
If the P2P systems are to become a reliable platform
for distributed resource-sharing (storage, computing, data
etc), then they must provide a predictable level of service,
both in content and performance. A necessary step to-
wards that goal is to develop mechanisms by which con-
tributions of individual peers can be solicited and pre-
dicted. In a system of autonomous but rational partici-
pants, a reasonable assumption is that the peers can be
incentivized using economic principles. Two forms of in-
centives have been considered in the past [5]: (1) mon-
etary payments (one pays to consume resources and is
paid to contribute resources), and (2) differential service
(peers that contribute more get better quality of service).
The monetary payment scheme involves a fictitious cur-
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rency, and requires an accounting infrastructure to track
various resource transactions, and charges for them using
micropayments. While the monetary scheme provides a
clean economic model, it seems highly impractical. For
instance, see [8] for arguments against such a scheme for
network pricing.
The differential service seems more promising as an in-
centive model, and that is the direction we follow. There
are many different ways to differentiate among the users.
For instance, one could define a reputation index for the
peers, where the reputation reflects a user’s overall contri-
bution to the system. In fact, a reputation based mecha-
nism is already used by the KaZaA [3] file sharing system;
in that system, it’s called the participation level. Quanti-
fying a user’s reputation and prevention of faked reputa-
tions, however, are thorny problems.
In general, since the nodes in a P2P systems are strate-
gic players, they are likely to manipulate any incentive
system. As a result, we argue that a correct tool for mod-
eling the interaction of peers is game theory [4]. We in-
troduce a formal model of incentives through differential
service in P2P systems, and use the game theoretic notion
of Nash Equilibrium to analyze the strategic choices by
different peers.
We treat each peer in the system as a rational, strate-
gic player, who wants to maximize his utility by partici-
pating in the P2P system. The utility of a peer depends
on his benefit (the resources of the system he can use)
and his cost (his contribution). Our differential service
model links the benefit any peer can draw from the sys-
tem to his contribution—the benefit is a monotonically
increasing function of a peer’s contribution. Thus, this
is a non-cooperative game among the peers: each wants
to maximize his utility. The classical concept of Nash
Equilibrium points a way out of the endless cycle of spec-
ulation and counter-speculation as to what strategies the
other peers will use. An equilibrium point is a locally op-
timum set of strategies (contribution levels in our case),
where no peer can improve his utility by deviating from
the strategy. While Nash equilibrium is a powerful con-
cept, computing these equilibria is not trivial. In fact, no
polynomial time algorithm is known for finding the Nash
equilibrium of a general N person game.
We first consider a simplified setting, homogeneous
peers, where we assume that all peers derive equal ben-
efit from everybody else (homogeneity of peers). In this
case, we show (1) there are exactly two Nash equilibria,
and (2) there are closed-form analytic formulae for these
equilibria. We also investigate the stability properties of
these equilibria, and show that in a repeated game setting,
the equilibrium with the better system welfare will be re-
alized.
We next consider the case of heterogeneous peers,
where the interaction matrix is an arbitrary N × N ma-
trix. That is, we allow an arbitrary benefit function for
each pair of peers. No closed form solution is possi-
ble for this setting, and so we study this using simula-
tion. We use the homogeneous case as a benchmark to
see how well the simulation tracks the theoretical predic-
tion. Our main findings are that the qualitative properties
of the Nash equilibrium are impervious to (1) exact form
of the probability function used to implement differential
service, (2) perturbations like users leaving and joining
the system, (3) non-strategic or non-rational players, who
do not play according to the rules, etc. Finally, we dis-
cuss practical ways of implementing a differential service
incentive scheme in a P2P system.
2 Our Incentive Model
2.1 Strategy and Nash Equilibrium
A traditional distributed system assumes that all partici-
pants in the system work together cooperatively; the par-
ticipants in the system share a common goal, do not com-
pete with each other or try to subvert the system. A P2P
systems, on the other hand, consists of autonomous com-
ponents: users compete for shared but limited resources
(e.g. download bandwidth from popular servers) and, at
the same time, they can restrict the download from their
own server by denying access or not contributing any re-
sources. As such, the interaction of the various peers in
a P2P system is best modeled as a non-cooperative game
among rational and strategic players. The players are ra-
tional because they wish to maximize their own gain, and
they are strategic because they can choose their actions
(e.g. resources contributed) that influence the system. The
behavior that a player adopts while interacting with other
players is known as that player’s strategy. In our set-
ting, a peer’s strategy is his level of contribution. The
player derives a benefit from his interaction with other
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players which is termed as a payoff or utility. Interest-
ing economic behavior occurs when the utility of a player
depends not only on his own strategy, but on everybody
else’s strategy as well. The most popular way of char-
acterizing this dynamics is in terms of Nash equilibrium.
Since the utility or payoff of a player is dependent on his
strategy, he might decide to unilaterally switch his strat-
egy to improve his utility. This switch in strategy will af-
fect other players by changing their utility and they might
decide to switch their strategy as well. The collection of
players is said to be at Nash equilibrium if no player can
improve his utility by unilaterally switching his strategy.
In general, a system can have multiple equilibria.
2.2 Incentives and Strategies in P2P System
We assume that there are N users (peers) in the system,
P1, P2, . . . , PN . We will denote the utility function of the
ith peer as Ui. This utility depends on several parameters
which we shall discuss below one by one.
2.2.1 Measuring the Contribution
We will use a single numberDi to denote the contribution
ofPi. The precise definition ofDi is immaterial as long as
it can be quantified and treated as a continuous variable.
For concreteness, we will take Di to be the cumulative
disk space: disk space contribution integrated over a fixed
period of time, say a week. One can also use other metrics
such as number of downloads served by this peer to other
peers.
For each unit of resource contributed, the peer incurs
a cost ci (measured in dollars). So the total cost of Pi
for participating in the system is ciDi. We shall find it
convenient to define a dimensionless contribution
di ≡ Di/D0, (1)
where D0 is an absolute measure of contribution (say
20MB/week). D0 is a constant that the system architect
is free to set—our incentive scheme will strive to ensure
that all peers make a contribution at least D0.
2.2.2 The Benefit Matrix
Each peer’s contribution to the system potentially benefits
all other peers, but perhaps to varying degrees. We encode
this benefit using a N × N matrix B, where Bij denotes
how much the contribution made by Pj is worth to Pi
(measured in dollars). For instance, if Pi is not interested
in Pj’s contribution, then Bij = 0. In general, Bij ≥ 0,
and we assume that Bii = 0, for all i. Again, we define a
set of dimensionless parameters corresponding to Bij by
bij = Bij/ci, bi =
∑
j
bij , bav =
1
N
∑
i
bi (2)
bi is the total benefit that Pi can derive from the system
if all other users make unit contribution each. bi will turn
out to be an important parameter in determining whether
it is worthwhile for Pi to join the system. We shall show
that there exists a critical value of benefit bc such that if
bi < bc, then Pi is better off not joining the system. bav is
simply the average of bi for the whole system.
2.2.3 Probability as Service Differentiator
The differential service is a game of expectations: a peer
rewards other peers in proportion to their contribution. A
simple scheme to implement this idea is as follows: peer
Pj accepts a request for a file from peer Pi with probabil-
ity p(di), and rejects it with probability 1 − p(di). Thus,
if Pi’s contribution is small, its request is more likely to
be rejected. There are many enhancements and improve-
ments to this simple idea. One could, for example, curtail
the search capabilities of a peer depending on his con-
tribution. In the Napster model, one could return only a
fraction p(di) of the total results found. We also assume
that every request from peer Pi is tagged with his con-
tribution di as metadata. We will discuss some of these
enhancements and implementation issues in section 5.
It turns out that the choice of the exact probability func-
tion does not affect the qualitative nature of our results.
Any reasonable probability function that is a monotoni-
cally increasing function of the contribution should do. In
our analysis, we have chosen the following natural form:
p(d) =
dα
1 + dα
, α > 0. (3)
It has the desirable properties that p(0) = 0, and p(d) →
1 as d gets large. The choice of the exponent α deter-
mines how “step-function-like” the probability function
3
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Figure 1: p(d) plotted as a function of d for values of α
1/2, 1, 4 and 10.
is. See Figure 1. For small values, say α = 1, the func-
tion is rather smooth; but for larger values, say α = 10,
the function has a steep step; for contribution below the
step, requests have high probability of rejection; and for
contribution above the step, requests have high probabil-
ity of acceptance.
2.2.4 The Utility Function
With these cost and benefit parameters, the total utility Ui
that Pi will derive by joining the system is
Ui = −ciDi + p(di)
∑
j
BijDj , Bii ≡ 0 (4)
The first term is the cost to join the system, while the sec-
ond term is the total expected benefit from joining the sys-
tem. In terms of the dimensionless parameter
ui =
Ui
ciD0
(5)
we rewrite the utility as
ui = −di + p(di)
∑
j
bijdj , bii ≡ 0 (6)
The −di term is simply Pi’s cost to join the system and it
increases linearly as Pi contributes more disk/bandwidth
to the system. Pi’s benefit depends on how much the other
peers are contributing to the system (dj), what that con-
tribution is worth to him (bij), and how probable it is that
0 
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Figure 2: A qualitative plot of utility vs. the contribu-
tion/strategy; the scales on X and Y axes are arbitrary.
Unless there is a critical level of benefit bc, the utility for
the peer is always less than 0.
he will be able to download that content (p(di)). Using
the fact that p(0) = 0 and p(∞) = 1, we can find the two
limits of the utility function :
lim
di→0
ui = 0, lim
di→∞
ui = −∞. (7)
Thus, neither extreme maximizes a peer’s utility. The
value of an intermediate strategy depends on the contri-
bution of other users and the worth of those contributions.
See Figure 2 for a graphical representation of a possible
utility function for different levels of benefit bi. If bi ex-
ceeds a critical value bc, then it is possible for the utility
function to have a maximum and only then the peer would
want to join the system.
In the next section we start with the discussion of Nash
equilibrium for the model that we have just described.
3 Nash Equilibrium in the Homoge-
neous System of Peers
We define a homogeneous system of peers to be a sys-
tem where bij = b for all i 6= j; in other words in this
system all peers derive equal benefit from everybody else.
This simplified system allows us to study the problem in
an idealized setting, and gain insights that can be applied
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to the more complex heterogeneous system. In the homo-
geneous system, the model of equation 6 reduces to
u = −d+ p(d)(N − 1)bd. (8)
bi = bav = b(N − 1) for all peers Pi. By symmetry,
therefore, the problem reduces to a 2-person game, which
we analyze below.
3.1 The Two Player Game
In a homogeneous system of two players, Equation 6 re-
duces to
u1 = −d1 + b12d2p(d1)
u2 = −d2 + b21d1p(d2) (9)
For algebraic simplicity, let us also assume that α = 1,
i.e. p(d) = d/(1 + d). As discussed in section 2.2, we
expect that if the benefits that the peers derive from each
other, i.e. b12 and b21 are too small then it will be best for
the peers not to join. The question to ask at this point is
whether a Nash equilibrium exists for large enough values
of benefits where both peers can derive non-zero utility
from their interaction.
This model is very similar to the Cournot duopoly
model [4] and we can analyze it using similar method-
ology. Suppose P2 decides to make a contribution d2 to
the system. Given this contribution d2, naturally the best
thing for P1 to do is to tune his d1 such that it maximize
his utility u1. Maximizing u1 with respect to d1, we im-
mediately find that the best response d1 is given by
r1(d2) ≡ d1 =
√
b12d2 − 1, (10)
where r1(d2) is known as the reaction function for P1.
This is the best reaction for P1, given a fixed strategy for
P2. Since P2 knows that P1 is going to respond in this
fashion, his own reaction function to 1’s strategy is
r2(d1) ≡ d2 =
√
b21d1 − 1. (11)
Nash equilibrium 1 exists if there is a set of (d∗
1
, d∗
2
), such
that they form a fixed point for equations 10 and 11, i.e.
1For readers versed in game theory, we want to say that we are only
interested in pure strategy Nash equilibrium. A mixed strategy will cor-
respond to a peer probabilistically choosing a contribution. Such a sce-
nario is inadmissible and and we shall not discuss it any further
the fixed points satisfy
d∗1 =
√
b12d∗2 − 1,
d∗2 =
√
b21d∗1 − 1. (12)
Finding the fixed point is much easier if we assume b12 =
b21 = b (this is the homogeneous peer system). In that
case d∗1 = d
∗
2 = d
∗ and the solution of equation 12 is
d∗ = (b/2− 1)±
(
(b/2− 1)2 − 1
)1/2 (13)
A solution to this equation exists only if b ≥ 4 ≡ bc. 2
Thus, bc = 4 is the critical value of benefit illustrated in
Figure 2 below which it is not profitable for a peer to join
the system. Note that this critical value 4 is an artifact of
the form of the p(d) we chose. For different choices of
p(d), this constant bc will change, but will always be a
constant independent of the number of peers in the sys-
tem. For b = bc, the only solution is d∗1 = d∗2 = 1. For
b > bc, there are two solutions
d∗1 = d
∗
2 = d
∗
lo < 1, and d
∗
1 = d
∗
2 = d
∗
hi > 1. (15)
which are plotted in Figure 3
3.2 The N Player Game
At this point we can come back to the homogeneous sys-
tem of peers of equation 8. A comparison of equations 8
and 9 shows that for the homogeneous system of peers,
the fixed point equations 12 are now
d∗ =
√
b(N − 1)d∗ − 1, (16)
or in other words
d∗ = (b(N − 1)/2− 1)±
(
(b(N − 1)/2− 1)2 − 1
)1/2
.
(17)
So, with the replacement of b by b(N − 1), the results
for the two peer system are exactly applicable for the N
player system as well. Although the homogeneous peer
system is not realistic, we shall see that the average prop-
erties of the Nash equilibria for the heterogeneous system
closely follow the homogeneous case.
2For general values of α,
d∗ =
(
(bα/2 − 1)±
(
(bα/2 − 1)2 − 1
)
1/2
)
1/α
(14)
A solution to this equation exists only if bα ≥ 4.
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Figure 3: The Nash equilibrium contributions for the two
peer system plotted as a function of scaled benefit (b −
bc)/bc. For b < bc, there are no equilibria. For all b > bc
there are two possible equilibria
3.3 Stability of the Nash Equilibria
Since our system has two possible Nash equilibria, the
natural question arises which equilibrium will be chosen
by the system in practice. There is a natural learning sce-
nario between peers which can help us answer this ques-
tion. Suppose the user P2 sets his contribution to some
d2 to start with. In this situation, P1 can use the reac-
tion function r1(d2) to set his optimum contribution at
d1. Seeing this contribution P2 adjusts his own contribu-
tion and thus each peer takes turns in setting their contri-
bution. If this process converges, then naturally that level
of contribution for P1 and P2 will constitute a Nash equi-
librium, i.e.
d∗1 = r1(r1(r1(r1(.....(d2)))))
d∗
2
= r2(r2(r2(r2(.....(d1))))). (18)
The learning process and convergence is graphically out-
lined in Figure 4. From the figure we see that under this
learning process, either the peers will quit the game (zero
utility) or they will converge to the equilibrium d∗
hi
. Note
that this iterative procedure gives us an algorithm to find
the stable Nash equilibrium of a game and we shall make
use of it in section 4. The fixed point d∗
hi
(d∗
lo
) is locally
stable(unstable), i.e. if the two peers start near the fixed
point, under iteration of the mappings, they will move
closer to (away from) the fixed point. It is gratifying to
d
d
2
1
21 2
r (d  ) r (d  )1
Stable
Unstable
Figure 4: The Cournot learning process near the vicinity
of the two fixed points. Here we have plotted the reaction
functions from equations 10,11. For any starting value of
d2 > d
∗
lo
(d∗
lo
is the unstable fixed point), the learning
process converges to the stable fixed point. If the starting
point is too close to the origin, then the iteration moves
away from the unstable fixed point and eventually ends
up at 0.
see that the stable Nash equilibrium d∗
hi
is also the desir-
able equilibrium for the performance of the system.
The stability of the fixed points can be estimated by
linearizing the mappings r1 and r2 near the fixed point [7].
Consider a point (d∗1 + δd1, d∗2 + δd2) close to the fixed
point (d∗
1
, d∗
2
). Expanding equation 12 around the fixed
point, we find that after one iteration, the new deviations
are given by
[
δd′
1
δd′2
]
=
[
0 (d∗
1
+ 1)/(2d∗
2
)
(d∗2 + 1)/(2d
∗
1) 0
] [
δd1
δd2
]
.
(19)
The new deviation will be smaller in magnitude than
the old deviation provided the maximum eigenvalue√
(d∗
1
+ 1)(d∗
2
+ 1)/(4d∗
1
d∗
2
) of the matrix on the RHS is
smaller than 1. For b > bc, the fixed point (d∗hi > 1),
is stable and the other fixed point (d∗
lo
) is unstable. For
b = bc, the two fixed points collapse into one. The eigen-
values of the matrix are exactly equal to one and the de-
viations neither increase, nor decrease in magnitude, i.e.
the fixed point is neutral.
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4 Nash Equilibrium in the Hetero-
geneous System of Peers
In a heterogeneous system, we need to deal with the full
complexity of the model. The fixed point equations for
α = 1 can be immediately derived in analogy with the
two player game (equation 12) as
d∗i =

∑
j 6=i
bijd
∗
j


1/2
− 1. (20)
Since it is not possible to solve this set of equations ana-
lytically, we use an iterative learning model to solve this
system of equations.
4.1 The Learning Model and Simulation
Results
Let us consider the interaction of users in a real P2P sys-
tem. Any particular peer Pi interacts only with a limited
set of all possible peers — these are the peers who serve
files of interest to Pi. As it interacts with these peers, Pi
learns of the contributions made by them and to maximize
its utility adjusts its own contribution. Obviously this con-
tribution that Pi makes is not globally optimal because it
is based only on information from a limited set of peers.
But after Pi has set its own contributions, this information
will be propagated to the peers it interacts with and those
peers will adjust their own contribution. In this way the
actions of any peer Pi will eventually reach all possible
peers. The reaction of the peers to Pi’s contribution will
affect Pi itself and it will find that perhaps it will be better
off by adjusting its contribution once more. In this way,
every peer will go through an iterative process of setting
its contribution. If and when this process converges, the
resulting contributions will constitute a Nash equilibrium.
The iterative learning algorithm that we have chosen to
solve equation 20 mimics this learning process. To start
with, all the peers have some random set of contributions.
In a single iteration of the algorithm, every peer Pi de-
termines the optimal value of di that it should contribute
given the values of d for other peers and the values of bij .
At the end of the iteration the peers update their contribu-
tion to their new optimal values. Since now the contribu-
tions di are all different, the peers need to recompute their
optimal values of di and we can start the next iteration.
When this iterative process converges to a stable point,
we reach a Nash equilibrium. In the following numerical
experiments we demonstrate that for heterogeneous sys-
tem of peers, the iterative learning process does converge
to the desirable Nash equilibrium d∗
hi
and we compare the
results with the analytic results for the system of homoge-
neous peers.
4.1.1 Choice of Parameters
We choose the number of peers N to be from 500-1000.
Since a peer Pi interacts only with a small subset of its
peers, bij is non-zero only for a few values of j. We also
assume that the peers for which bij is non-zero are picked
randomly from all possible peers. Note that this subset is
not the set of neighbors in the overlay network sense, but
the set of other peers with whom it exchanges files. The
size of the set for which bij 6= 0 is chosen to be 2% of N .
In general for smaller value of this fraction, the algorithm
takes longer to reach the Nash equilibrium, but the equi-
librium itself does not change. The values of bij do not
evolve in time and we choose them from a Gamma distri-
bution. The choice of Gamma distribution was arbitrary,
we have experimented with Gaussian distribution as well.
We choose the initial values of di from a Gaussian distri-
bution. The distribution di evolves at every iteration and
eventually converges to the Nash equilibrium distribution.
The value of α for all our results is 1.0 unless otherwise
specified.
4.1.2 Convergence to Nash Equilibrium
In Figure 5 we show the distribution of bij and di for
N = 1000 peers. The values of bij were chosen from a
Gamma distribution such that bav = 6.0. The equilibrium
values d∗i distribute themselves in a bell shaped distribu-
tion with mean d∗
av
= 3.68. If the system was completely
homogeneous, than the distribution of bij would consist
of a single peak at b = bav/(N − 1) and the correspond-
ing value of d∗
hi
from equation 17 would be 3.73 which is
less than 1.5% away from the value of d∗av. In Figure 6 we
show the equilibrium average contribution by the peers as
a function of average benefit. The solid line is the solution
from the homogeneous system. As expected, the equilib-
rium contribution increases monotonically with increas-
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Figure 5: Distributions of benefit and resulting contribu-
tion for 1000 peers. The histogram for benefits is the
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1
N
∑
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(equation 13).
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Figure 7: Average contribution at Nash equilibrium plot-
ted against number of steps required to reach Nash equi-
librium for 500 and 1000 peers. We assumed convergence
was reached when the average contribution per peer dif-
fered no more than one part in a million. The average
initial value of contribution per peer is 1.0. The values of
average benefit are scaled as usual.
ing benefit. For average benefit bav < bc, the iterative
algorithm converges to di = 0. Note that the two sets of
results for 500 and 1000 peers almost coincide with each
other. So our results are essentially independent of system
size.
In Figure 7 we show the approach to convergence for
the learning algorithm. The two data sets correspond to
different values of average bav. Higher the average value
of bav, faster is the convergence to equilibrium. As the
value of bav approach the critical value bc, approach to
equilibrium becomes slower and slower. This is to be ex-
pected since we have argued in section 3.3 that near the
critical point, any deviation dies out very slowly. We have
observed that for a wide set of initial conditions for di, the
process always converges to a unique Nash equilibrium.
For very small initial values of di, we are close to the
unstable Nash equilibrium and the iteration converges to
zero, i.e. the contribution by all peers vanish and the sys-
tem collapses. The data for system collapse is not shown,
but Figure 4 illustrates the situation.
4.1.3 Inactive or Uncooperative Peers
In Figure 8, we show the effect of some peers leaving the
system. Intuitively one would think that if some peers
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neous system model (equation 13).
leave the system, the benefit per peer would be reduced
and we should be seeing pretty much the same behavior
as in Figure 6. Our simulations confirm this intuition. As
the fraction of active peers dwindle, the contribution from
each of the peers decrease and at some point, the benefits
are too low for the peers and the whole system collapses.
The system can be pretty robust for high benefits : for a
benefit level of (bav − bc)/bc = 2.0, the system can sur-
vive until 2/3 of the peers leave the system. In contrast
to traditionally fragile distributed systems, we see that for
P2P systems robustness increase with size : as the system
grows bigger and bigger, benefits for each peer increases
and the system becomes more robust to random fluctua-
tions.
In Figure 9 we explore the effect of having peers which
behave uncooperatively, i.e. they refuse to adjust their
contribution and simply make a constant contribution.
The effect of such non-cooperative peers is clear. If they
constitute 100% of the peers, of course the average con-
tribution is equal to their contribution. Otherwise their
effect is to bias the equilibrium contribution value toward
them.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have proposed a differential service based
incentive mechanism for P2P systems to eliminate free
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Figure 9: Average contribution at Nash equilibrium plot-
ted against fraction of uncooperative peers. Total num-
ber of peers is 1000. The labels specify the average
contribution of uncooperative peers. Average benefit is
bav/bc − 1 = 0.5.
riding and increase overall availability of the system. We
have shown that a system with differential incentives will
eventually operate at Nash equilibrium. The strategy of
a peer Pi wishing to join the system depends on a single
parameter bi which is the benefit that Pi can derive from
the system. If the benefit bi is larger than a critical benefit
bc, then the peer’s best option is to join the system and
operate at the Nash equilibrium value of contribution. If
on the other hand bi < bc, the peer is better off not joining
the system. When bi = bc, the peer is indifferent between
these two options. These properties are robust and do not
depend on the details of the particular incentive mecha-
nism that is used.
5.1 Implications for System Architecture
The incentive policy that we have discussed can be imple-
mented with minor modifications to current P2P systems.
Let us look at some of the modifications required.
Current P2P architectures do not restrict download in
any way except by enforcing queues and maximum num-
ber of possible open connections. Our incentive scheme is
easily implemented by accepting requests from peers with
a probability p(d). To prevent rapid fire requests from the
same peer, it will be necessary to keep record of a request
for a small duration of time. In our discussion we have as-
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sumed that the function p(d) is same for all users, i.e. it is
part of the system architecture which can not be modified
by users. For greater flexibility, it is possible to allow in-
dividual peers to configure p(d), but the effects on overall
system performance is not clear.
The contribution is measured in terms of uptime and
disk space. When a peer makes a request for a file,
the contribution information can be attached as an extra
header to the request. In fact, the current Gnutella pro-
tocol already sends metadata like shared disk space and
uptime with its request messages. New users can be given
a default value of contribution for a limited period of time
so that they can start using the system at a reasonable
level.
There is incentive for peers to misreport contributions
so that they can reap the benefit of the system while mak-
ing no contribution. To prevent such misuse, it is possible
to implement a neighbor audit scheme. Such a scheme is
especially attractive in a fixed network topology such as
the CAN [9] or Chord [12] system. Every peer will con-
tinually monitor the uptime and disk space of its neighbor.
If any doubt exists about the accuracy of the information
reported by a peer, the information can be verified from
its neighbor.
5.2 Alternative Metrics for Contribution
and Incentive
We have touched upon only a handful of questions that
are relevant to building a reliable P2P architecture with
incentives. There are many unresolved issues which will
have to be addressed in future by system architects. For
example, what is the best metric for the contribution of a
user? A popular metric is the number of uploads provided
by a peer. So the peers that provide the most popular files
and have the highest bandwidth are deemed to contribute
the most. Our metric, which simply integrates disk-space
over time does not discriminate against low bandwidth
peers or peers which provide file which are not very pop-
ular. Such a metric is very appropriate for a project like
Freenet [1] which aspires to be an anonymous publish-
ing system regardless of the popularity of the documents
published. The metric that is in practical use by KaZaA is
called participation level and is given by
participation level =
uploads inMB
downloads inMB
× 100. (21)
The participation level is capped at a maximum of 1000.
Our analysis of incentives relied on the peers being ra-
tional and trustworthy. Trust is not easy to enforce. The
neighbor audit scheme will deter individual misbehavior,
but collusion among a set of peers is still possible. An-
other trust related problem involves malicious peers who
contribute fake files. The idea of EigenTrust [6] is a sig-
nificant step in this direction which also protects against
collusion among malicious peers.
The incentive scheme we have outlined is through se-
lective denial of requests. There are other ways to imple-
ment incentives. For example one could implement dif-
ferential service for Pi by restricting the download band-
width to a fraction p(di) of the total bandwidth available.
KaZaA’s participation level operates on a similar princi-
ple: if more than one peer requests the same file, the peer
with smaller participation level is pushed to the back of
the queue.
Instead of implementing incentives on download level,
one could also restrict the search capabilities of a peer.
The basic idea is to reduce the number of peers to which
queries are propagated. In Gnutella, a peer forwards a
query to its neighbors based on the Time To Live (TTL)
field. By reducing the TTL of the query or by forward-
ing the query only to a fraction of the total neighbors, the
search space for the query can be restricted.
scaledTTL forPi = ⌈p(di)× initial TTL⌉ (22)
We note that the effect of restricting search using a func-
tion p(d) is not equivalent to restricting download using
the same function. Network topology will have a signifi-
cant role to play in determining the actual set of files that
a user has access to. Regardless of the actual implemen-
tation of incentives, our conclusions concerning existence
and properties of the Nash equilibrium in the system will
remain qualitatively unchanged.
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